Conflict, Negotiations, and EU Enlargement
Christina J. Schneider
Cambridge University Press, 2009
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Abstract
My book proposes a new way of thinking about EU enlargement. My main argument states that the various EU enlargement rounds were successful despite the existence of distributional conflicts, because governments redistributed EU enlargement gains a) between the applicant countries and EU member states and b) between the relative winners among EU members to the relative loser among EU members.
Specifically, EU enlargement may increase the aggregate gains of membership for all current members and at the same time trigger distributional conflicts between current and future members. Conflict most likely arose when new members were expected to receive large shares of the European Agriculture Guidance (EAGGF) and Guarantee and European Reconstruction and Development (ERDF) funds. Conflict also emerged on the integration of labor markets, especially if the applicant countries had significantly lower per capita income and lower wages than the old members.
Distributional conflicts pose a threat to the successful termination of accession negotiations because enlargement has to be approved unanimously. As the relative losers of enlargement may delay a compromise on the policy under negotiations factually indefinitely, they can credibly threaten the supporters of enlargement into accepting some redistributional measure. EU members principally may apply two different strategies to change the balance of costs and benefits in favour of enlargement. Differentiated -- or discriminatory -- membership serves as one such redistributive instrument. The transitional limitation of the newcomer's membership rights establishes pareto-efficiency because it compensates the relative losers of enlargement without leaving the new member states worse off permanently. A second instrument to redistribute the enlargement costs in favour of the relative losers of enlargement implies that the supporter of enlargements among current EU members shoulder some of the enlargement costs themselves to compensate the brakemen of enlargement.
The analysis uses a unique data set on all five EU enlargement rounds and is separated into three parts, each addressing one theoretical component. Generally, EU members tend to delay accession negotiations and demand for compensation if they anticipate conflicts over the distribution of benefits and costs. The major benefits of the EU transfers, for example, object an unconditional accession of states that would induce an unfavourable shift of those transfers. Along similar lines, the demand for a continued protection of labor markets arose from EU members with serious labor market problems. The empirical examination of the second component then depicts that candidates are less likely to be admitted unconditionally if distributional conflicts arise. Under this condition, the likelihood that applicants receive limited membership rights increases sharply. At the same time, discrimination of new members is less likely if the relative winners of enlargement offer some redistribution at their expense. Finally, a comparative study of the Mediterranean and the Eastern expansions sheds further light on the trade off between discriminatory membership and inner-union redistribution in the enlargement talks.
