Losing Muslim Hearts and Minds: Religiosity, Elite Competition, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World

Lisa Blaydes
blaydes@stanford.edu
Department of Political Science
Stanford University

Drew A. Linzer
dlinzer@emory.edu
Department of Political Science
Emory University

Abstract

The battle for public opinion in the Islamic world has been described as a new front for the U.S. in its war on terror. The current debate over why many Muslims hold anti-American views centers around whether individuals dislike "who Americans are" with respect to fundamental aspects of culture and government, or "what Americans do" policy-wise in international affairs. This paper proposes, instead, that Muslim anti-Americanism is predominantly a domestic, elite-led phenomenon that intensifies when there is greater competition between Islamist and secular-nationalist political factions within a given country. While more observant Muslims tend to be more anti-American, paradoxically the most anti-American countries are those with Muslim populations that are less religious and thus more divided on the religious-secular issue dimension. We test our hypothesis using a multilevel statistical model applied to the opinions of over 12,000 Muslim respondents in 21 countries collected in 2007 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project.

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1 Introduction

Since September 2001, polling firms and non-governmental agencies have questioned citizens of the Islamic world about how they view Americans, U.S. policy, and American values and culture. Where public sentiment runs against the United States, it does so strongly. According to surveys conducted as part of the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, in the spring of 2003, just one percent of Jordanian respondents and fewer than one percent of Palestinian respondents gave a favorable rating to the United States. Between 2002 and 2008, only 20 percent of Turkish and Pakistani Muslims viewed the United States favorably. The consequences of such anti-American sentiment among Muslims abroad are seen to delegitimize American values, increase sympathy for America's enemies, and weaken America's influence in foreign affairs (Naím, 2003; Shore, 2005; Keohane and Katzenstein, 2007; Kull, 2007).

The depths of anti-Americanism in the Islamic world—and the Arab world in particular—have been much remarked upon (e.g., Parker, 1988; Ajami, 2001; Fuller, 2002; Abdallah, 2003; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004; Kohut, 2007). Less noticed is that in many countries, Muslims actually tend to view the United States quite favorably. And even within the Arab world, there is a considerable amount of cross-national variation in levels of anti-Americanism. Why, then, do some Muslims harbor such intense dislike for America, while others are more neutral or even supportive of the United States as a global actor?

Anti-Americanism has been defined as "any hostile act or expression that becomes part and parcel of an undifferentiated attack on the foreign policy, society, culture and values of the United States" (Rubinstein and Smith, 1988, 36) and more recently as "a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general" (Katzenstein and Keohane, 2007, 12). Research scholars and commentators have argued at length over why Muslims in particular might adopt such a stance, with most explanations settling into one of two categories. The first is that Muslims who dislike the United States do so on the basis of cultural differences and fundamental disagreements over societal norms and values. Paz (2003), for example, writes that Islamists—those who advocate the formal integration of Muslim social and religious precepts into government—view conflict with the United States as a "war of cultures" and that "the nature of Islamist anti-Americanism is cultural rather than military or political." A consequence of such reasoning is that there is not much the United States can do to remedy anti-American sentiment, short of making (impossible) fundamental changes in the American way of life.

The second hypothesis counters that Muslims dislike America not for "who Americans are," but rather "what Americans do." Proponents of this argument dominate the academic and public opinion literature on anti-Americanism (Cole, 2006; Esposito, 2007; Kull, 2007). Writes Makdisi (2002, 538): "Anti-Americanism is a recent phenomenon fueled by American foreign policy, not an epochal confrontation of civilizations." Likewise, Shore (2005, 481): "Most pious Muslims do not dislike the United States because of its freedoms. What they find repellent is the perceived inconsistent

application of our values;" Fuller (2002, 57): "Muslim societies may have multiple problems, but hating American political values is not among them. U.S. policymakers would be wise to drop this simplistic, inaccurate, and self-serving description of the problem;" and Abdallah (2003, 70): "Arab hostility is primarily directed at specific U.S. policies, not at America or the American people."

Despite their conflicting perspectives on the causes of anti-American attitudes, what these explanations have in common is a presumption that individuals form their opinions about the United States primarily as a *direct* reaction to what the U.S. is or does. While this may be true in part, it neglects the important intermediary role played by political elites in determining what information about the United States individuals hear, how they interpret this information, and how they incorporate it into their perspectives on their political environment (Zaller, 1992). As Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) demonstrate, Muslims who get their news only from Al Jazeera are significantly more anti-American than those who watch only CNN. Like people everywhere, Muslims are open to persuasion on the issue of anti-Americanism and susceptible to elite influence through the mass media (e.g., Lynch, 2007).

In this paper, we propose a theory of anti-Americanism that transcends the conventional "what America does" versus "who America is" debate. Instead, we submit that observed levels of anti-Americanism among Muslims in a given country depend primarily on the intensity of anti-American messages being voiced by prominent political elites within that country. Simply put, the reason many Muslims tell public opinion researchers that they hold an unfavorable opinion of the United States is because trusted political leaders tell them so. But what is especially important about this association is that it is predominantly *domestic* forces that determine the strength with which elites press anti-American claims. In particular, when competition between a country's Islamist and secular-national political factions is great, political leaders from both sides have strong incentives to use anti-American rhetoric to boost mass support. Less intense conflict between these two groups dampens those incentives, leading to more balanced elite attitudes towards the United States, and thus less anti-American sentiment in the minds of individual Muslims.

Since Islamists tend to be more anti-American than their secular counterparts, this logic explains why—seemingly paradoxically—while religious Muslims are more anti-American than their less pious compatriots, anti-American attitudes are most prevalent in more *secular* countries where the political division between religious and non-religious individuals is the greatest. It also highlights how little the United States may actually be able to do to reduce anti-Americanism, as long as the U.S. remains a convenient target for opportunistic political leaders in parts of the Muslim world.

Previous scholars have termed domestic sources of anti-American attitudes "instrumental" anti-Americanism, reflecting the efforts of a Muslim political elite which "instigates and manipulates hostility toward the United States in order to mobilize domestic support" (Rubinstein and Smith, 1988, 41). Or, as Rubin (2002, 73) puts it, "such animus is largely the product of self-interested manipulation by various groups within Arab society, groups that use anti-Americanism as a foil to distract public at-

tention from other, far more serious problems within those societies." While scholars such as Rubin (2002) and Lynch (2007) focus on the way that Arab authoritarians use anti-American rhetoric as a diversionary tactic, the broader question remains of why Muslim elites in some countries would see more or less value in promoting anti-American attitudes; and why even within countries, certain Muslim elites would be stronger advocates than others of anti-American sentiment. Our theory offers an explanation for the conditions under which such instrumental anti-Americanism is more or less likely to be found; and, applying a multilevel statistical model to the analysis of public opinion survey data from over twelve thousand Muslim respondents in 21 countries, we are the first to systematically test for—and find empirical evidence of—instrumental anti-Americanism at work.

Any attempt to account for the variation in anti-American sentiment across the Muslim world faces the challenge of explaining highly complex processes and relationships that have come about as a result of multiple causes. Although systematic cross-national research into the causes of Muslim anti-Americanism is rare, the most prominent examples of such studies (e.g., Chiozza, 2009) have made clear the difficulty of the task. The intensity of political competition along religious-secular lines—the key explanatory variable that we propose—explains a substantively large amount of the cross-country variation in anti-American sentiment across the Islamic world.

Increasing scholarly understanding of the roots of anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world has important and far-reaching political implications. One and a half billion Muslims make up one-fifth of the total world population, and favorable attitudes toward the U.S. are rarer in the Muslim world than anywhere else (Kohut and Stokes, 2006). Many of of the world's most intractable conflicts involve Muslim-majority countries, and the ability of the U.S. to exercise "soft power" to influence the trajectories and outcomes of these disputes is of considerable importance.[1] Our research into the basis for and rigidity of anti-American sentiment makes the externalities associated with certain aspects of U.S. foreign policy both tangible and explicit. Is it true that changes in attitudes towards the United States must come from within the Muslim world, "through social and cultural developments" as claimed by Paz (2003)? Or can changing American economic and policy choices make a sustained difference? To the extent that American economic and political policymakers are concerned with the public opinion "costs" of their actions abroad, the analyses we present can be used to inform those decisions which affect not only the status, but also the security, of the United States with respect to the rest of the world.[2]

[1]Nye (1990, 2004) describes soft power as the ability to attain policy objectives through cooptation, persuasion and attraction rather than coercion or through the use of side payments.

[2]See also Gerges (1999) for discussion of how various perspectives towards Islamic politics shape American foreign policy decisions.

2 Sources of Muslim Opposition to the U.S.

The grievances that motivate many Muslims to express anti-American sentiments have been linked to specific actions taken by the United States in foreign political and economic affairs, as well as America's growing global cultural influence since the end of the Second World War (Rubinstein and Smith, 1988).[3] The question that contemporary scholars continue to debate is which among this "amalgam of discontents" (Kohut and Stokes, 2006, 23) matters most for explaining anti-American attitudes, with implications for what policy changes the United States might feasibly and productively pursue—and at what cost—if American leaders choose to seek to ameliorate anti-American sentiment.

In this section, we review the factors generally accepted as the basis for Muslim anti-Americanism. Yet although anti-American attitudes are prevalent in the Islamic world, they are not universal. As such, the problem with each of these sets of explanations is not that they fail to capture legitimate grievances; but rather that they fail to predict why certain Muslims are motivated by *any* grievance to express an unfavorable attitude towards the United States. In the following section, therefore, we propose an alternate hypothesis: that it is largely the influence of domestic elites, exploiting these potential grievances for political gain, that predicts whether individuals adopt anti-American attitudes.

2.1 U.S. policy and the foreign backlash

A number of key U.S. foreign policy developments in the second half of the twentieth century have provided fodder for the spread of anti-American sentiment in the Islamic world. The first is related to America's involvement in the internal political and economic affairs of a number of countries with large Muslim populations. During the Cold War, America propped up dictators seen as friendly to the U.S., and worked to topple regimes with leanings toward the Soviet Union. American "overidentification" with unpopular local dictators like the Shah of Iran or Sadat in Egypt was one factor contributing to mass anti-American sentiment (Parker, 1988, 53).

American government agencies, such as USAID, also intervened in the economic planning of a number of developing Muslim countries (Thornton, 1988, 10). As aid was disbursed conditionally, a perception emerged that foreign assistance assistance was used politically by the U.S. to "enslave" a country. American involvement in Pakistani political and economic life, for example, is widely deplored, and secular elites tend to describe their ill feelings toward the U.S. in terms of "capitalist or imperialist exploitation" (Kizilbash, 1988, 59, 63). Muslim leftists, such as Egyptian

[3] In fact, during the first half of the twentieth century, the image of the United States in the Arab world—a key constituency in the broader set of Islamic countries—was generally positive, as Arabs saw Americans less as imperialists and more as liberal, benevolent educators and missionaries (Makdisi, 2002).

economist Samir Amin, have argued that American economic intervention in the Middle East is part of a global imperialist strategy on the part of the United States.

Another key U.S. foreign policy development in the post-World War II era is related to American support for the state of of Israel. There is widespread anger on the part of many Muslims towards the U.S. for political support of Israel, which is invariably seen as coming at the expense of Palestinian interests. The fate of Jerusalem—the third most holy city in Islam and the location of important Muslim holy sites—is also of importance to Muslims around the world. Describing the Arab world, Hammond (2007, 57) writes that, "views of the United States today are first and foremost conditioned by American policy vis-à-vis the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the degree to which the United States is seen backing Israel to the detriment of the Palestinians."

2.2 Islamism and cultural anti-Americanism

One of the most important political developments to emerge in the Muslim world over the last four decades has been the growth of support for what many term Islamism—the idea that both society and political systems in Muslim-majority countries should be infused with a greater religious sensibility. This has been coupled with the rise of what has been called the "mosque movement." According to Mahmood (2004), the mosque movement emerged as a response to the perception that religious knowledge as a means for organizing daily life had become marginalized under modern structures of governance. Piety activists increasingly sought to imbue aspects of daily life with an Islamic ethical sensibility rather than modern secular ethics.

Within the Muslim world, some of the strongest proponents of anti-American attitudes are found in Islamist political circles (Paz, 2003; Faath and Mattes, 2006). Islamist groups and their supporters in Yemen are "among the main bearers of anti-Americanism" (Münzner, 2006, 111). Hizballah—the popular political and paramilitary Shi'a organization in Lebanon—regularly expresses anti-American sentiment (Vogt, 2006, 147-8). The same pattern is evident in Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Malaysia, and Morocco (Reetz, 2006; Ufen, 2006; Vogt, 2006; Zeghal, 2008). In sub-Saharan Africa, criticism of the U.S. has emerged as part of the "standard verbal repertoire" of Islamic preachers (Seeseman, 2006, 202). Interestingly, however, Seeseman (2006) emphasizes that Islamic leaders in Africa tend to focus their attention more on "local and national problems," making "broad anti-American radicalization... rather unlikely."

According to the Islamist vision, the United States represents a primary threat to Muslim society and is to blame for a variety of domestic and international political problems (Ajami, 2003). In the Arab world, Islamists promote the idea of a "global Western conspiracy against the Arabs and the Arab and Muslim world," which "provides the Islamists with their main justification and motive for developing the image of the 'American enemy' " (Paz, 2003). Many Islamists "see the United States as the

neo-Mongol power lurking behind the apostate governments that they seek to topple" (Doran, 2002, 183).

Large segments of Muslim society are receptive to this anti-American rhetoric. Opinion surveys indicate that most Muslims believe Americans are not religious enough, and that the religious beliefs that they do hold drive the U.S. to make bad decisions in the world (Kohut and Stokes, 2006, 93). Although many individuals across the Muslim world enjoy American movies, television, and music, they also view globalization and the spreading influence of American culture as potential threats to local beliefs and traditional ways of life (Faath and Mattes, 2006; Kohut and Stokes, 2006; Hammond, 2007). One way that individuals shore up their cultural identity in response to the perceived effects of U.S. influence is by turning to Islam. Murphy (2002) argues that identification with Islam counteracts feelings of inferiority towards the West, providing an individual with a renewed sense of cultural dignity. Similarly, writes Fuller (2002, 54-55), "most in the Muslim world feel themselves besieged by the West... Islamist movements today provide a key source of identity to peoples intent on strengthening their social cohesion against Western cultural assault."

3 Explaining Anti-Americanism

The unpopularity of certain U.S. policies and negative reaction to the spread of American culture both represent plausible reasons why Muslims around the world might hold anti-American attitudes. Nevertheless, many do not. In 2007, the Pew Global Attitudes Project (GAP), a cross-national opinion poll sponsored and directed by the nonpartisan Pew Research Center in Washington, DC, asked respondents in 46 countries if they had a "a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the United States" (Q16A). Large proportions of Muslims around the world told researchers that they in fact had a *favorable* view of the United States (Figure 1). To explain anti-Americanism, it is not enough to demonstrate that potential grievances *exist*—a valid theory must also account for the observed variation in anti-American sentiment not only across Muslim individuals, but even more strikingly across Muslim countries.

In part, Muslim anti-Americanism reflects some basic economic and political realities. Many individuals genuinely object to a variety of American actions and perceived cultural infringements. Across the Islamic world, there are also fundamental differences in countries' level of development and political and economic relationship with the United States. Poorer countries receive significantly larger amounts of U.S. foreign economic aid. Wealthier countries import greater amounts of merchandise from the United States. Countries in the Middle East are more geographically proximate to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

But in addition to this, in many countries, political elites have taken the lead in inflaming anti-American sentiment for their own political gain. As a phenomenon of public opinion, anti-Americanism does not simply emerge organically in response to



Figure 1: *Distribution of favorable and unfavorable opinions towards America among Muslims in 21 Pew GAP study countries in 2007. Light gray bars denote more extreme opinions on either side. Percentages exclude respondents with no opinion.*

U.S. actions. Rather, people's attitudes are shaped by what their political leaders say about the United States: the more insistently elites promote anti-Americanism, the more individuals tend to adopt anti-American attitudes. That such influences matter is not a novel claim; in fact, the idea that individuals are susceptible to elite influence when forming their political attitudes is central to most mainstream theories of mass opinion formation (e.g., Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992; Kinder, 1998; Druckman and Lupia, 2000; Gabel and Scheve, 2007, although these theories have been tested nearly exclusively in the context of American politics). A further implication is that in countries where political elites adopt a neutral or even positive stance towards the United States, individuals should be relatively more pro-American as well.

The broader question, then, is why political debate in various countries is more or less saturated with anti-American messages; and, in particular, why political elites in different countries are more or less prone to adopt and espouse anti-American positions. We propose that anti-Americanism arises primarily as a byproduct of political competition between Islamist and secular-reformist groups, and therefore depends little on the particular policy choices or economic or cultural practices of the

United States. When political struggles between Islamists and secularists intensify, both sides have incentives to invoke grievances against the United States to help win supporters. The consequence of this is a rise in observed levels of anti-Americanism.

3.1 The religious-secular cleavage and political identity

In large parts of the Islamic world, the substance of political debate is dominated by a secular-religious issue cleavage akin to the left-right ideological dimension that describes policy preferences in most Western democracies.[4] Debate concerning the nature of the governing regime and the role of the state in society is central to the secular-religious divide. Policies such as the promotion of family planning practices and the use of interest in banking would be considered relatively "secular" policies. A ban on female drivers, censorship of books and films that contain "un-Islamic content," and the introduction of an Islamic penal code would fall on the religious side of the spectrum. While there are some issues that do not fit into this framework, many of the major policy issues—and perhaps the most politically salient—facing Muslim societies can be arrayed along this dimension. Roy (1994, 23) writes that despite the protests of some political actors, "any political action amounts to the automatic creation of a secular space or a return to traditional segmentation" where a more traditional space refers to one with a greater religious sensibility. Hunter (1995, 327) argues that Muslim-majority countries are characterized by a "rift between the more Westernized and the more traditional segments" and that this division has important political implications.

The modern historical basis for this cleavage dates to the mid-19th century. Hunter (1998, 75-6) explains that as European powers increasingly gained in economic and political prominence with respect to the Muslim world, Muslim-Western relations that had previously been characterized as competition between "equals" evolved into "that between the dominating and the dominated." Two schools of thought emerged among Muslims seeking to explain the causes of this shift: "Islam the Culprit, Westernization the Solution" and "Islam not the Culprit, Return to Islam the Solution" (Hunter, 1998, 76-77). While the former involved emulation of Western political organization and secularization, the latter encouraged a more rigorous application of religion to life. From the 1920s until the 1970s, "most Muslim societies underwent a process of state-directed secularization and cultural and political nationalization" (Hunter, 1998, 85).

Since then, Islamism has emerged as the primary ideological rival to secular nationalism, though the pace at which secular nationalism has given way to Islamism varies considerably across states. Fuller (2002, 50) goes so far as to call Islamism the "primary vehicle and vocabulary of most political discourse throughout the Muslim world... No other ideology has remotely comparable sway." Some have argued that secular nationalism failed to successfully incorporate dissatisfied social groups and

[4] See, for example, Laver and Schofield (1998) and Klingemann et al. (2006).

classes (Sutton and Vertigans, 2005). In the Arab states, the rise of Islamism has also been associated with the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (e.g., Ajami, 1992; Salem, 1994), where, according to Hammond (2007), Islamists and secular nationalists continue to "argue vociferously" about how best to respond to that defeat. Other scholars, for example Wickham (2002, 6), see the growth of Islamism as due more to the successful "mobilizing efforts of opposition [Islamic] elites" than as a "natural result of accumulated grievances." Whatever the exact cause, Browers (2009, 1) observes that even when secular nationalists and Islamists confront a common opponent in the form of corrupt, authoritarian regimes, they have still shown themselves to be "each other's worst enemy."

One consequence of the political division between Islamist and secular ideologies is that in many countries, Muslims' political identity is closely aligned with their religiosity and religious identity. Those who are more religiously observant are more exposed to, as well as more predisposed to listen to and adopt, the political ideas of the Islamist political elite. Muslims who are comparatively more secular will tend to take their cues from the secular elite. If a country's Islamist leaders are especially anti-American in their rhetoric, then their followers will receive and internalize those considerations, and accordingly report stronger anti-American views to public opinion researchers. Where and when secular-nationalist elites follow suit in expressing anti-American sentiments, their followers will echo such attitudes.

The implication of this logic is that, to the extent Islamist leaders are more anti-American than their secular counterparts, religious individuals should also be more likely to report anti-American attitudes. We test for, and find evidence of this pattern, later in our analysis. But in a sample of countries as diverse as the ones in our study, generalities such as these are just that—generalities. The experience of Muslims in Lebanon represents one case in which the exception may prove the rule. In Lebanon, the Islamist bloc is strongly aligned with Shi'a community, and the secular Muslim leadership is aligned with the Sunni community. Accordingly, in the 2007 GAP study, 93 percent of Lebanese Shi'a reported an unfavorable attitude towards the U.S., while only 52 percent of Lebanese Sunnis did the same.

3.2 Elite competition and the value of anti-American rhetoric

Islamism and secular nationalism represent the two dominant political-intellectual trends in the Muslim world. Yet although contemporary anti-Americanism is primarily associated with Islamism, in fact proponents of *both* ideologies have been known to publicly criticize the United States. For secular leaders, who historically positioned themselves as anti-colonial and anti-imperialist, anti-American attitudes tend to reflect a perception of America as encroaching on the independence and sovereignty of countries in the Muslim world. In the Arab world, where anti-American attitudes are widespread, Hammond (2007, 205) describes both camps as "virulently anti-American." At the country level, if mass anti-Americanism is a manifestation of elite opinion leadership, then anti-American attitudes should be most widespread in

countries where elites from across the political spectrum have incentives to promote grievances against the United States.

We contend that the *intensity of competition* between secular-nationalist and Islamist elites for the backing of potential supporters provides those incentives, and is a significant determinant of how vigorously political elites appeal to anti-Americanism. During the Cold War, the association between anti-Americanism and communism gave anti-American rhetoric a certain strength, but at the same time placed limits on its ability to appeal broadly. More recently, however, anti-Americanism has become what Krastev (2004, 6) calls an "all-purpose ideology;" compelling yet vague enough to be harnessed by any number of political groups for "cynically designed political strategies" seeking to mobilize supporters for political gain.[5]

The level of mass support for—and political influence of—both secular-nationalist and Islamist parties and groups varies considerably by country. In Mali, for example, explicitly religious parties are prohibited and "extremist" ideologies are opposed by most Malians (Brulliard, 2009). In Lebanon, the Islamist political organization Hizballah won 11% of legislative seats in the 2005 elections, as one of over a dozen primary Muslim, Christian, and Druze parties. Among those they opposed included the more secular Muslim Future Movement. In Egypt, candidates backed by the Muslim Brotherhood have found electoral success, winning approximately 20% of the seats in the 2005 parliamentary election. Anti-American demonstrations there have been organized by both the secularists and the Muslim Brotherhood (Mitchell, 2004, 98). In the Palestinian territories, Hamas won a majority of parliamentary seats in 2006. Intense secular-Islamist political conflict is also evident in Turkey, where there is vigorous multi-party competition between Islamist parties such as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and other more moderate factions; and Bangladesh, where the two major parties are the secular Awami League and the BNP, which allies with more explicitly Islamist groups. Finally, anti-American sentiment in Indonesia is found in the pronouncements of Islamists as well as non-Islamists, who tend to focus on what they see as America's neo-Imperialist economic ambitions (Bowen, 2007, 245).

One factor contributing to the intensity of competition along secular-religious lines is the level of religiosity in the population, with competition greatest in countries with comparable shares of more- and less-religious individuals. In Muslim communities where religious leaders already monopolize the local political scene, competition for "converts" is no longer as fierce. In such cases, the battle for local supremacy has already been won by those who are more religious, leaving neither side with strong incentives to recruit supporters. This contrasts with more competitive political environments in which local political dominance has not yet been established and there is greater incentive to ramp up the anti-American dialogue. In highly religious Muslim countries, there is also less to be gained for religious leaders by disparaging America

[5]Krastev (2004) also sees anti-corruption and anti-terrorism rhetoric as having many of the same properties as the instrumental use of anti-Americanism to mobilize populations.

and its (democratic) political values, as free elections are likely to bring them to or allow them to maintain their hold on power.[6] Likewise, secular leaders—vulnerable to Islamist electoral victories, revolution, or loss of influence on an existing authoritarian regime—may see the U.S. as an ally in the protection of civil liberties from policies of Islamists in power. The result is that anti-Americanism is *lower* in more religious countries, even as individual piety is associated with stronger anti-American opinions.

4 Statistical Analysis of Muslim Public Opinion

We have hypothesized that the level of anti-Americanism among a country's Muslim population should be greatest where the competition between political elites along Islamist-secular lines is most intense, as this creates incentives for those elites to foment anti-American sentiment for their own political gain. The outcome of this elite-led process is what we contend survey researchers are largely detecting when they ask individual Muslims their opinion of the United States.

To systematically test our hypothesis, we apply a multilevel statistical model to the responses of Muslims to the 2007 Pew GAP study of public opinion in 21 countries around the world. As shown in Figure 1, these countries span a geographically, economically, and culturally diverse range. In our analysis, we only consider responses from individuals who identify themselves as Muslim; a total of 12,831 respondents. Country-level sample sizes range from 34 in Kenya to 1,930 in Pakistan.

Pew has fielded a Global Attitudes survey in every year from 2002 to 2009, but the 2007 study that we analyze is the most comprehensive of the entire series.[7] Other than in 2003—coinciding with the United States' invasion of Iraq—levels of opposition to the United States in Muslim countries have proven to be extremely consistent from year to year (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2009). The variation, instead, is found *across* countries in their long-term, baseline levels of anti-Americanism. As Chiozza (2007, 125) observes, the negative response among Muslims to the 2003 invasion was "a momentary reaction to the exceptional circumstances of the Iraq War rather than a structural shift in the popular perceptions of the United States." By 2004, Muslim perceptions of the United States had returned to pre-war, 2002 levels, and have remained mostly steady since that time.

[6]See Lynch (2007, 207) for more on how in some cases Islamists have actively promoted democratic reforms, encouraging peaceful coexistence with Western countries like the U.S.

[7]For example, of our 21 study countries, only Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey were surveyed in all eight years. Even when certain countries were surveyed in multiple years, the wording of the GAP questionnaire itself changed from year to year.



Figure 2: *Proportion of Muslims in each country reporting a "very unfavorable" opinion of the United States, versus proportion seeing a struggle between "groups who want to modernize the country and Islamic fundamentalists." Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project (2007).*

4.1 Assessing the intensity of competition

The intensity of conflict between Islamist and secular groups is difficult to operationalize in a consistent manner—especially in countries that do not have traditionally consolidated democratic institutions. From the 2007 GAP survey, we produce two measures of secular-Islamist competition and one measure of individual-level religiosity. In seventeen countries, Muslim respondents were asked if they perceived a "struggle in our country between groups who want to modernize the country and Islamic fundamentalists" (Q75). Assuming such perceptions can be taken as a measure of the actual level of struggle between the two groups, as the intensity of secular-Islamist conflict increases, the overall level of anti-Americanism among Muslims in a country also clearly increases (Figure 2).[8]

The GAP survey also asked Muslim respondents a series of questions regarding their level of religious commitment. We recode responses to these questions as a dichotomous variable for piety, considering those respondents highly religious who report praying five times a day (Q114), fasting on most or all days of Ramadan and other religious holidays (Q116), and stating that religion is very important in their lives (Q117).[9] Five times a day prayer is a particularly good standard by which to

[8]This question was not asked in Ghana, India, Kenya, or Uganda.

[9]These questions were not asked in Ghana, India, Kenya, Morocco, or Uganda.

judge an individual's level of religiosity because while the mid-day, afternoon, sunset and evening prayers tend to take place at times when most individuals are typically awake, the dawn, or *fajr*, prayer takes place at a time when most individuals are asleep.[10] Willingness to rise for the dawn prayer demonstrates a high level of religious commitment. Tallying the proportion of Muslims in each country who are pious provides the second (indirect) measure of the competitiveness of the political environment, with more competitive countries those with lower average levels of religiosity. Values of this variable in our sample range from 36 percent in Turkey to 90 percent in Kuwait.

4.2 A hierarchical model of anti-Americanism

Our hypothesis produces testable implications at both the individual and country level. As the structure of the survey data places individual respondents within countries, we model the dependent variable—opinion of the United States—using a Bayesian hierarchical model with both individual-level and country-level components.[11] Responses to the anti-Americanism question, y, are coded (1) for very favorable through (4) for very unfavorable, so that larger numbered responses reveal stronger anti-American sentiment. The probability that a respondent $i = 1 \ldots N$ gives any of the four possible responses on y can be represented using a four-category ordered multinomial logit,

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr(y_i = 1) &= \text{logit}^{-1}(c_1 - \mu_i) \\
\Pr(y_i = 2) &= \text{logit}^{-1}(c_2 - \mu_i) - \text{logit}^{-1}(c_1 - \mu_i) \\
\Pr(y_i = 3) &= \text{logit}^{-1}(c_3 - \mu_i) - \text{logit}^{-1}(c_2 - \mu_i) \\
\Pr(y_i = 4) &= 1 - \text{logit}^{-1}(c_3 - \mu_i)
\end{aligned}$$

where μ_i is an individual's latent level of anti-Americanism, and c_1, c_2, and c_3 denote cutpoints separating the four observable outcomes along the latent continuum.[12]

We specify the individual-level model for each respondent's latent anti-Americanism μ_i as a function of x_i, the dichotomous variable for whether or not respondent i is highly religious:

$$\mu_i = \beta^0_{j[i]} + \beta^1_{j[i]} x_i, \tag{1}$$

where $\beta^0_{j[i]}$ is the level of anti-Americanism in country j for non-religious individuals, and $\beta^1_{j[i]}$ captures the added effect of religiosity on μ_i in country $j = 1 \ldots 21$. Larger values of $\beta^0_{j[i]}$ and $\beta^1_{j[i]}$ are associated with higher overall levels of anti-Americanism.

At the country level, we model the β parameters as random effects, with means calculated as a linear function of the level of reformer-Islamist struggle in a country, z_1, and two other control variables, which we denote z_2 and z_3. The first control

[10] Take for example prayer times in Cairo on October 23, 2009. The latter four prayers were to take place at 11:41 am, 2:59 pm, 5:28 pm and 6:45 pm—all times during the waking hours of most individuals. The dawn prayer, on the other hand, was scheduled to take place at 4:28 am.

[11] A useful reference for such statistical models is Gelman and Hill (2007).

[12] The inverse logit function is $\text{logit}^{-1}(x) = e^x/(1 + e^x)$.

variable, z_2, measures the percent of each country's population that is Muslim. As Muslims increasingly dominate domestic politics, we expect the potential stakes of secular-Islamist competition to increase, and anti-American messages voiced by Muslim leaders to be more prevalent in political discourse. In countries with relatively smaller Muslim populations, there may be less diversity of opinion within the Muslim community as a result of the ease of communicating ideas within a smaller group, or pressure to conform politically in the face of competition with another religious bloc. Countries with fewer Muslims are also less anti-American overall, which may affect the opinions of Muslims in those countries.[13]

Concern about potential confounding effects also leads us to investigate a series of additional country level controls, z_3. First, we include a measure of the "direct" exposure of Muslims in each country to the United States, calculated as the (logged) per capita dollar value of a country's imports of goods from the U.S. in 2007. Our expectation is that anti-American sentiment will increase with greater U.S. cultural and economic presence. As this variable is highly correlated with a country's per capita GDP in our sample—that is, wealthy countries import more on a per capita basis from the U.S.—we also expect richer countries to be more anti-American.[14] Relatively poorer countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, tend as well to receive more U.S. foreign economic aid, potentially making citizens of those countries more sympathetic towards the United States.[15] Next, we examine the potential effect of a country's geographic proximity to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, operationalized as the distance in thousands of miles from each country's capital to Jerusalem. The increased salience of this conflict may begin to explain the high levels of anti-Americanism observed in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and, of course, the Palestinian territories. It might also partially explain the low levels of anti-Americanism observed among Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, we test for any effects on a country's level of anti-Americanism associated with domestic military expenditure and level of political rights.[16]

[13]Data for countries' Muslim population share are obtained from the Pew Research Center (2009).

[14]Data on the total dollar value of imports from the United States in 2007 are available from the Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau; `http://tse.export.gov`. Population data are obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database (The World Bank, 2008). GDP data also come from The World Bank (2008) and are measured in current U.S. dollars, log-transformed. We use 2005 data because measures of per capita GDP are unavailable for the Palestinian territories in 2006 and 2007. The correlations between logged per capita GDP in 2005, 2006 and 2007 for the remaining 20 countries are all greater than 0.99.

[15]U.S. foreign economic aid in 2007 is measured in historical dollars in units of billions, and is taken from the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants Obligations and Loan Authorizations (Greenbook) database, U.S. Agency for International Development; `http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov`.

[16]Military expenditures as a percent of GDP are taken from the The World Bank (2008) for the year 2007. Our measure of political rights is the 2007 Freedom House score; `http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=372&year=2007`. The number of active duty U.S. troops stationed in each country—which might theoretically increase *or* decrease anti-Americanism—exhibited almost no cross-national variation in 2006-2007; according to the military

The upper-level (country) model is specified as:

$$\beta_j^0 = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} z_1 + \gamma_{02} z_2 + \gamma_{03} z_3 + \varepsilon_0 \tag{2}$$

and

$$\beta_j^1 = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} z_1 + \gamma_{12} z_2 + \gamma_{13} z_3 + \varepsilon_1. \tag{3}$$

Country-level error terms ε_0 and ε_1 are assumed to vary normally with mean zero and standard deviation σ_0 and σ_1, respectively. To complete the specification of the Bayesian model, we place uniform priors on σ_0 and σ_1, vague normal priors on the γ coefficients, and fix the middle cutpoint $c_2 = 0$ for identifiability (c_1 and c_3 are estimated). Because x contains missing values, we model it as a Bernoulli distributed random variable. We also model z_1 as distributed normally since it is missing for a subset of countries. This allows us to retain in our analysis all observations and countries with missing data. Coefficient estimates are reported in Table 1.[17]

For both religious and non-religious Muslims, as the level of competition between secular and Islamist groups increases, so does the probability of reporting an unfavorable attitude of the United States. This is consistent with our assertion that the causes of Muslim anti-Americanism are primarily "instrumental" and have more to do with countries' domestic politics than with American culture or policy. The country-level effect of competition on anti-Americanism is both large and robust to model specification, and the finding holds whether we use as our measure of competitiveness the perceived level of struggle or the total religiosity of the Muslim population (recall that more religious populations are associated with *less* intense secular-Islamist competition). The top part of Table 1 also confirms that anti-Americanism is more widespread among Muslims in countries where Muslims comprise a larger share of the population. The more "structural" control variables (z_3), however, have relatively minor or even no effect on levels of anti-Americanism, and do not confound the effect of secular-Islamist struggle. Coefficients in the bottom part of Table 1 indicate that religious Muslims are more likely to have an unfavorable opinion of the U.S., although the marginal effect of competitiveness on anti-Americanism is lower for more pious individuals.

To more fully interpret the results of Model 1, we calculate and plot the predicted probability that a religious versus non-religious individual will hold an anti-American attitude in countries characterized by different values of the independent variables. We vary the percentage of Muslims in each country who see a reformer-Islamist struggle from 10% to 80%, slightly greater than the observed range among

personnel statistics of the U.S. Department of Defense Information Analysis Division, no more than a few dozen U.S. troops were stationed in countries other than Egypt, Kuwait, and Turkey.

[17] The model is estimated using WinBUGS version 1.4.3 (Lunn et al., 2000) and the R package R2WinBUGS (Sturtz, Ligges and Gelman, 2005) implemented in R version 2.10.1 (R Development Core Team, 2009). WinBUGS code is provided in Appendix A. Posterior parameter densities are simulated using three parallel chains of 1,000 iterations each, discarding the first half. Convergence was achieved with $\hat{R} \approx 1$ for all parameters.

Country effect (β^0)		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Constant	$\hat{\gamma}_{00}$	-2.9 (0.7)	-0.1 (0.9)	-3.3 (1.4)	-2.8 (0.9)	-2.1 (0.8)	-3.0 (0.8)	-3.4 (0.9)
Reformer-Islamist struggle	$\hat{\gamma}_{01}$	3.2 (1.4)		3.2 (1.6)	3.4 (1.6)	3.2 (1.3)	3.7 (1.4)	3.6 (1.3)
Total religiosity	$\hat{\gamma}_{01}$		-3.2 (1.2)					
Proportion Muslim	$\hat{\gamma}_{02}$	1.8 (0.7)	2.0 (0.7)	1.9 (0.8)	2.1 (0.8)	1.9 (0.7)	1.9 (0.8)	2.0 (0.7)
US imports per capita, log	$\hat{\gamma}_{03}$	0.1 (0.1)	0.3 (0.1)					
GDP per capita, log	$\hat{\gamma}_{03}$			0.1 (0.2)				
U.S. foreign economic aid	$\hat{\gamma}_{03}$				0.1 (1.1)			
Proximity to Jerusalem	$\hat{\gamma}_{03}$					-0.2 (0.1)		
Military expenditure (% of GDP)	$\hat{\gamma}_{03}$						0.1 (0.2)	
Level of political rights	$\hat{\gamma}_{03}$							0.2 (0.1)
Piety effect (β^1)								
Constant	$\hat{\gamma}_{10}$	1.8 (0.4)	1.1 (0.5)	1.6 (0.7)	1.8 (0.4)	1.9 (0.4)	2.0 (0.5)	2.0 (0.5)
Reformer-Islamist struggle	$\hat{\gamma}_{11}$	-1.2 (0.6)		-1.3 (0.8)	-1.0 (0.6)	-1.1 (0.6)	-1.0 (0.7)	-1.2 (0.6)
Total religiosity	$\hat{\gamma}_{11}$		0.7 (0.6)					
Proportion Muslim	$\hat{\gamma}_{12}$	-1.1 (0.4)	-1.3 (0.4)	-1.1 (0.4)	-1.1 (0.4)	-1.0 (0.4)	-1.2 (0.5)	-1.1 (0.4)
US imports per capita, log	$\hat{\gamma}_{13}$	0.0 (0.1)	0.0 (0.1)					
GDP per capita, log	$\hat{\gamma}_{13}$			0.1 (0.1)				
U.S. foreign economic aid	$\hat{\gamma}_{13}$				0.2 (0.5)			
Proximity to Jerusalem	$\hat{\gamma}_{13}$					0.0 (0.1)		
Military expenditure (% of GDP)	$\hat{\gamma}_{13}$						0.0 (0.1)	
Level of political rights	$\hat{\gamma}_{13}$							0.0 (0.1)
Cutpoints	$\hat{c}_1$	-1.6	-1.6	-1.6	-1.6	-1.6	-1.6	-1.6
	$\hat{c}_3$	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Country-level error terms	$\hat{\sigma}_0$	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9
	$\hat{\sigma}_1$	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4

Table 1: *Hierarchical model coefficient estimates and posterior standard deviations, in parentheses. Dataset includes 12,831 respondents in 21 countries. Positive coefficients indicate variables that have an increasing effect on overall levels of anti-Americanism in a country.*

our study countries. We then consider hypothetical countries in which Muslim population share is near its minimum (10%), mean (65%), and maximum (100%); and at the same time are in the lower third of per capita imports from the U.S. (≈ $3), middle third (≈ $15), or upper third (≈ $400). At each combination of the country-level covariates, the probability of reporting a somewhat or very unfavorable attitude towards the United States is

$$\widehat{\Pr}(y_i = 3) + \widehat{\Pr}(y_i = 4) = 1 - \text{logit}^{-1}(-\hat{\mu}_i) \tag{4}$$

where, for secular individuals ($x_i = 0$),

$$\hat{\mu}_i = \hat{\gamma}_{00} + \hat{\gamma}_{01} z_{1[i]} + \hat{\gamma}_{02} z_{2[i]} + \hat{\gamma}_{03} z_{3[i]}, \tag{5}$$

and for highly religious individuals ($x_i = 1$),

$$\hat{\mu}_i = (\hat{\gamma}_{00} + \hat{\gamma}_{10}) + (\hat{\gamma}_{01} + \hat{\gamma}_{11}) z_{1[i]} + (\hat{\gamma}_{02} + \hat{\gamma}_{12}) z_{2[i]} + (\hat{\gamma}_{03} + \hat{\gamma}_{13}) z_{3[i]}. \tag{6}$$

These values are displayed in Figure 3.

From the lower-left to the upper-right of Figure 3, our model can predict almost the entire range of probability that a Muslim individual will express anti-American sentiments. The variable measuring a country's level of reformer-Islamist struggle can, in particular, explain variation of *fifty percentage points* or more in the probability of holding an unfavorable attitude towards America (depending on values of the other two variables). Among Muslims, anti-American attitudes are most prevalent when reformers and Islamists are most competitive, in countries that are predominantly Muslim, and where the level of imports from the United States on a per capita basis is large. Redrawing Figure 3 replacing the perceived level of struggle in a country with that country's total level of religiosity does not significantly affect the overall pattern; nor does substituting in any of the other country-level control variables for per capita imports from the U.S.

Also as expected, *within* countries, religious Muslims are consistently more anti-American than their less observant compatriots, although the magnitude of the individual-level piety effect varies by context. Religiosity matters less for explaining anti-Americanism when anti-Americanism is already high; in such locales, both secular and religious elites are expected to exploit anti-American grievances, and thus more- and less-religious Muslims both tend to share anti-American attitudes. As overall levels of anti-Americanism decrease, however, religious Muslims remain relatively anti-American, whereas more secular Muslims become increasingly favorable towards the United States. The gap between predicted levels of anti-Americanism for pious and secular individuals is greatest when competition is lowest. Because low overall levels of religiosity are associated with more intense secular-Islamist competition, the figure illustrates exactly how more religious countries are less anti-American even though more religious individuals are more anti-American.



Figure 3: *Predicted probabilities that religious and non-religious individuals will express anti-American sentiments,* $\widehat{\Pr}(y_i = 3)$ *plus* $\widehat{\Pr}(y_i = 4)$*, by national context: level of conflict between secular and Islamist elites, percentage of the country's population that is Muslim, and per capita value of goods imported from the United States. Muslims who are highly religious (solid line) are more anti-American than those who are less religious (dashed line).*

5 Case Study Evidence from Turkey and Senegal

Turkey and Senegal are among the most dissimilar countries in the Muslim world in terms of their level of political contestation between secular and Islamist groups (Figure 2).[18] According to the 2007 GAP study, in Turkey, 71 percent of Muslims saw a struggle between modernizers and Islamic fundamentalists, while only 36 percent were highly religiously observant. In Senegal, by contrast, only 14 percent of Muslims observed a reformer-fundamentalist struggle, yet 83 percent were highly religious. We have already shown that levels of anti-Americanism are very high in Turkey and very low in Senegal. We now present case study evidence of the mechanism we have proposed to explain why: prominent political elites from across the political spectrum voicing strong anti-American sentiments in Turkey, but neutral or even *pro*-American sentiments in Senegal.

5.1 Senegal: Religious but not Islamist, and pro-American

Sanneh (1997, 179) calls secularism and religiosity the two massive but uneven influences on West African politics during the post-colonial period.[19] Like many African countries that gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s, Senegal inherited a secular state structure following its period of colonial rule by France. The governing apparatus in the newly independent Senegalese state came to be dominated by a narrow elite of Francophone technocrats and intellectuals. Nominally Muslim but secular in their outlook and orientation, this elite was bound together by what O'Brien (2003, 53) calls the powerful "secularizing" influence of French language, culture and education. A university education in French became a prerequisite for employment in the state bureaucracy though less than twenty percent of the population spoke French with any degree of fluency and less than one percent used French exclusively.

In contrast to this very circumscribed secular elite, the vast majority of Senegalese have historically been highly religious, identifying with one of a handful of Islamic Sufi brotherhoods.[20] The system of political compromise that emerged in Senegal brought together the secular Francophone elite with the leaders of the Sufi brotherhoods. Recognizing the need for an intermediary between the state and the masses, the secular elite worked closely with these Islamic leaders (e.g., Haynes, 1996; Villalon, 1995), frequently demonstrating their acquiescence and, in some cases, even submission (Dieye, 2009). The leaders of the Sufi orders, by allowing the secular elite to run the state, created a system of coexistence for the religious brotherhoods that

[18]In selecting these countries for more in-depth analysis, we are following the recommendations of King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 140) that "the best 'intentional' design selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable (and any control variables) without regard to the values of the dependent variable."

[19]According to Sanneh (1997, 183), the secular nation-state has had a profound impact on African society although only recently introduced. In Muslim societies across West Africa, Islamic clerics have clashed frequently with secular strongmen (Sanneh, 1997).

[20]Sufism is generally described as mystical Islamic belief and practice.

obviated the need for political competition within the set of Sufi groups. This is not to say that there does not exist tension between the secular elite and the Sufi Brotherhoods. Forms of "symbolic confrontation" (O'Brien, 2003) over issues like family law and the inclusion of religious instruction in education demonstrate the relevance of the secular-religious conflict in Senegalese daily life (Mbow, 2009). Despite this, the citizens of Senegal are overwhelmingly pious Muslims living in a country whose political system is dominated by a narrow, secular bureaucratic elite.

In recent years, a reformist Islamist movement has emerged that has called for the adoption of Islamic law in Senegal (Loimeier, 1996). These individuals have been described as urban fundamentalists (O'Brien, 2003, 58) for whom criticism of secular values is a "favorite sport" (Mbow, 2009). The influence of these groups is fairly limited, however, as the Sufi brotherhoods continue to dominate Senegalese associational life (Clark, 1999). Senegalese citizens, then, can be broadly thought of as belonging to one of three groupings: a very small minority of well-educated Francophone secularists, a nascent urban-based fundamentalist Islamist movement and an overwhelming majority of individuals belonging to one of a small set of Sufi brotherhoods.[21] A high level of religious observance characterizes the latter two groups which represent the vast majority of Senegalese.

Internationally, Senegal has cultivated and currently enjoys a very strong relationship with the United States. Over the past decade, numerous American politicians and dignitaries have visited Senegal, and have been received well. There is little to be gained in the context of Senegalese politics by denigrating the United States; as such, Muslims in Senegal are among the most pro-American in the world.

5.2 Turkey: The most anti-American country in the world

Turkey is a relatively wealthy yet secular Muslim nation with an intensely competitive multi-party democratic political system, that, since at least 2005, has been among the most anti-American countries in the world (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2009). How did this come to be, especially in light of the fact that Turkey and the U.S. have enjoyed cooperative political and security ties? The modern history of Turkey begins with Mustapha Kemal Ataturk's extensive and thorough secularization of the nation as it transitioned from the failed Ottoman Empire to the contemporary Turkish nation-state (Hunter, 1998, 85). Mainstream anti-American attitudes first began to emerge early in the Cold War, but were largely confined to the Turkish left, who strongly opposed the nature and extent of U.S. involvement in Turkish political affairs. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Turkish right aligned itself with the United States against international Communism (Criss, 2002).

With the decline of Cold War bipolarity, however, the salience of the religious-secular issue dimension intensified in Turkey, starting in the 1980s and continuing

[21] Villalon (1995, 238) points out that there are no clearly distinguishable boundaries between Sufi and and reformist Islamist organizations in Senegal but rather that these groups exist on a continuum.

through the present (Criss, 2002; Taspinar, 2005). Kalaycioglu (1999), using public opinion data from the World Values Survey, found that in the 1990s, individuals' religiosity corresponded closely with party preferences, whereas social class and economic satisfaction mattered little. According to Hale (2002, 178), the political poles in contemporary Turkey are Kemalist secularism and political Islamism, and this cleavage has superseded the traditional left-right socioeconomic divide. The intensity of the religious-secular cleavage in Turkey is reflected not only in Turkey's formal party organizations, but also in the substance of a number of highly prominent national debates about the role of religion in Turkish public and political life—for example, concerning state policies prohibiting women from attending schools or universities while wearing the Islamic headscarf. Yavuz (2009, 12) argues that "the politics of Turkey has become the conflict and competition over different lifestyle and value systems." The Turkish political system remains highly fragmented reflecting deep cleavages in the political culture (Gunes-Ayata and Ayata, 2001, 91).

Anti-Americanism in Turkey is now embraced by all segments of Turkish society, and both secular nationalists and Islamists engage in stridently anti-American rhetoric (Taspinar, 2005; Cohen, 2007). Islamists, like the elite associated with the Justice and Development Party, have been relentlessly and publicly negative in their portrayal of the U.S. (Cagaptay, 2008). Pollock (2005) describes anti-Americanism in Turkey as a "combination of old leftism and new Islamism" where "just about every politician and media outlet (secular and religious) preaches an extreme combination of America- and Jew-hatred that... voluntarily goes far further than anything found in most of the Arab world." He relates that the Islamist newspaper, *Yeni Safak*, and the mainstream secular paper, *Hurriyet*, are both rife with conspiracy theories, including how U.S. forces in Iraq have been harvesting the organs of dead Iraqis for sale in the U.S.; and how secret American nuclear testing was actually responsible for the Southeast Asian tsunami.

While the existence of strongly anti-U.S. writings and demonstrations on the part of Islamists may not be surprising, it is increasingly clear that Kemalists have followed suit. Anti-imperialist rhetoric is a main theme of secular national Kemalists, who argue that Turkey is under a "lethal threat" from both the U.S. (the external enemy) and religious Muslims (the internal enemy) (Akyol, 2008).[22] Deniz Baykal, leader of the secular nationalist Republican People's Party, has developed a reputation for blaming the U.S. for political strife in Turkey (The Economist, 2005). Secularist rallies, some of which draw millions of supporters, frequently feature demonstrators carrying anti-American placards (Somer, 2007; Zaman, 2007). Secular nationalist intellectuals also argue that American policies in the Middle East are part of a "neo-colonial" effort to establish hegemony in the region: for example, that a U.S. bombing in Iraq triggered a major earthquake in Turkey in 2003; that the U.S. is keeping Turkey out of Iraq to ensure Turkey is not able to exploit Iraq's oil resources; and

[22]This is not to say that there is a single form of secularism in Turkey. See Yavuz (2009, 153) for more on these important distinctions.

that Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein were both on the American payroll (Cagaptay, 2004).[23]

6 Conclusion

Katzenstein and Keohane (2007, 12-13) describe anti-Americanism as a cognitive structure, or schema, that helps individuals to make sense of the world by creating a coherent narrative of historical and contemporary events. While anti-American attitudes are widely held by Muslims worldwide, the strength of those sentiments vary both at the individual level and at the country level. Under what conditions, then, are anti-American schemas more or less likely to arise?

We have argued that in Muslim communities around the world, a tendency to view the United States negatively is associated with the degree of political competition between secular and religious groups. The competitiveness of a country's political environment motivates elites to pursue anti-American rhetoric as a tactic to win political support. As Muslim societies are increasingly divided along secular-religious lines, competition between secular and Islamist elites intensifies. Much of the the anti-Americanism that opinion researchers find among Muslims around the world, arises, then, in response to the messages individuals hear from the Islamist or secular-nationalist political elites with whom they identify. In the Muslim world, Islamist leaders have taken the lead on fomenting anti-American sentiment to gain political advantage, which explains why pious Muslims tend to be more anti-American. Paz (2003) writes that anti-Americanism "has been a means to mobilize the Muslim world within the culture of global Jihad." But in many cases, secular nationalist segments of the Muslim elite follow suit. Empirical examination of attitudes toward the United States demonstrates that even though at the individual level, religiosity is associated with greater anti-Americanism, at the country level, the most anti-American countries are those in which the Muslim population is less religious (more divided) overall.

Explaining why many Muslims dislike America can offer perspective on the utility of the policy options available to the United States in reducing American unpopularity abroad. Previous scholarly work has suggested that anti-Americanism based on attributes of America and Americans is less likely to moderate over time as it is based on deep-seated attitudes, in contrast to concerns about American policies which may be more mutable (Thornton, 1988, 13). As the Muslim reaction to the events of 2003 makes clear, the actions of the United States in the Islamic world do affect perceptions of and support for the U.S. as a global actor.

[23]Turkey's media environment has also changed in the last twenty years with implications for how elites influence public opinion. While in the past, the Turkish citizenry was largely rural with a single television channel and few media outlets, increasingly Turkish citizens are subject to a variety of elite perspectives (Taspinar, 2005). New media outlets and particularly the popularity of television have emerged as tremendously important in shaping opinion (Gunes-Ayata and Ayata, 2001, 105).

That said, it is extremely unclear how far a more balanced approach to American foreign policy-making would go towards eradicating anti-Americanism in the Islamic world. As Ajami (2003, 61) argues, "the United States need not worry about hearts and minds in foreign lands... If Muslims truly believe that their long winter of decline is the fault of the United States, no campaign of public diplomacy shall deliver them from that incoherence." Crockatt (2007, 94) similarly makes the case that anti-Americanism tells us more about those voicing such sentiment than it does about America. Our results indicate that to the extent Muslim anti-Americanism is an elite-led phenomenon, a certain degree of pessimism is warranted towards the potential of American actions to lessen negative perceptions of the United States in the Islamic world.

Appendix A

WinBUGS code for the estimation of the Bayesian hierarchical ordered logit model.

```
model {
    for (i in 1:N) {
        y[i] ~ dcat(p[i,])

        p[i,1] <- Q[i,1]
        p[i,2] <- Q[i,2]-Q[i,1]
        p[i,3] <- Q[i,3]-Q[i,2]
        p[i,4] <- 1-Q[i,3]

        logit(Q[i,1]) <- cutp[1]-mu[i]
        logit(Q[i,2]) <- cutp[2]-mu[i]
        logit(Q[i,3]) <- cutp[3]-mu[i]

        mu[i] <- b.country[cnum[i]] + b.pious[cnum[i]]*pious[i]

        pious[i] ~ dbern(p.pious) # for missing data
    }
    for (j in 1:ncountry) {
        b.country[j] ~ dnorm(mu.country[j],tau[1])
        mu.country[j] <- g.country[1] + g.country[2]*z1[j]
                                      + g.country[3]*z2[j]
                                      + g.country[4]*z3[j]

        b.pious[j] ~ dnorm(mu.pious[j],tau[2])
        mu.pious[j] <- g.pious[1] + g.pious[2]*z1[j]
                                  + g.pious[3]*z2[j]
                                  + g.pious[4]*z3[j]

        z1[j] ~ dnorm(p.z1,tau.z1) # for missing data
    }
    for (j in 1:2) {
        tau[j] <- pow(sd[j],-2)
        sd[j] ~ dunif(0,100)
    }
    for (j in 1:4) {
        g.country[j] ~ dnorm(0,0.0001)
        g.pious[j] ~ dnorm(0,0.0001)
    }

    cutp[1] ~ dnorm(0,0.0001)I(,cutp[2])
    cutp[2] <- 0   # fix at 0 for identifiability
    cutp[3] ~ dnorm(0,0.0001)I(cutp[2],)

    p.z1 ~ dunif(0,1)
    tau.z1 <- pow(sd.z1,-2)
    sd.z1 ~ dunif(0,100)
    p.pious ~ dunif(0,1)
}
```

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